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Abstract. We study an independent best-response dynamics on net-
work games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies
independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the
convergence time to an equilibrium as a function of this probability, the
degree of the network, and the potential of the underlying games. These
dynamics are somewhat more suitable for distributed environments than
the classical better- and best-response dynamics where players revise
their strategies “sequentially”, i.e., no two players revise their strategies
simultaneously.
1 Introduction
Complex and distributed systems are often modeled by means of game dynamics
in which the participants (players) act spontaneously, typically striving to max-
imize their own payoff. Such selfish behavior often results in a so-called (pure
Nash) equilibrium which, roughly speaking, corresponds to the situation in which
no player has an incentive to change her current strategy.3
Consider the natural scenario in which people interact on a (social) network
and take their decisions based on both their personal interests and also on what
their friends decided. Situations of this sort are often modeled by means of
games that are played locally by the nodes of some graph (see, e.g., [14] and [13,
Chapter 19]). For example, players may have to choose between two alternatives
(strategies), and each strategy becomes more valuable if other friends also choose
it (perhaps it is easier to agree than to disagree, or it is better to adopt the same
technology for working, rather than different ones).
In many cases, an extremely simple procedure to convergence to an equilib-
rium is the so-called best-response dynamics in which at each step one player
⋆ Supported by IRIF (CNRS UMR 8243) and Inria project-team GANG.
3 In this work we consider only pure Nash equilibria, which are the equilibria that
occur in certain games when each player chooses one strategy out of the available
ones. Other equilibrium concepts are also studied, most notably the mixed Nash
equilibrium, where each player chooses a probability distribution over the available
strategies.
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revises her strategy so to maximize her own payoff (and the others stay put).
These dynamics work in more general settings (not only on network games),
where convergence to an equilibrium is proven via a potential argument (every
move reduces the value of a global function – called potential). Games of this
nature are called potential games and they are used to model a variety of situa-
tions. Interestingly, this argument fails as soon as two or more players move at
the same time.
In this work we study a natural variant of best-response dynamics in which
we relax the requirement that one player at a time moves. That is, now play-
ers become active independently with some probability and all active players
revise their strategy according to the best-response rule (or more generally any
better-response rule). This is similar as before but allowing simultaneous moves.
Specifically, we study the convergence time of these dynamics when players play
on a network a “local” potential game: (1) each player interacts only with her
neighbors, meaning that the strategies of the non-neighbors do not affect the
payoff of this player, and (2) locally the game is a potential game (see Section 2
for more details and formal definitions).
Simple examples show that convergence is impossible if two players are always
active (move all the time), or that the time to converge can be made arbitrarily
long if they become active at almost every step. At the other extreme, if the
probability of becoming active is too small, then the dynamics will also take a
long time to converge since almost all the time nothing happens. The trade-off
is between having sufficiently many active players and, at the same time, not
too many neighboring players moving simultaneously.
1.1 Our Contribution
We investigate how the convergence time depends on the probabilities of be-
coming active and on the degree of the network. This is also motivated by
the search for simple dynamics that the players can easily implement without
global knowledge of the network (namely, they only need to known how many
neighbors they have), nor without having complex reasoning (they still myopi-
cally better-respond). We first show that for the symmetric coordination game,
the convergence time is polynomial whenever the probability of being active is
slightly below the inverse of the maximum degree of the network (Theorem 2
and Corollary 1). This generalizes to arbitrary potential games on graphs, where
every node plays a possibly different potential game with each of its neighbors,
and the maximum degree is replaced by a weighted maximum degree (see The-
orem 6). These results indeed hold whenever each active player uses a better
response (not necessarily the best response). Finally, we prove a lower bound
saying that, in general, the probabilities of becoming active must depend on the
degree for otherwise the convergence time is exponential with high probability
(Theorem 5 and Corollary 2). Note that this holds also for the simplest scenario
of symmetric coordination games.
Our upper bounds can be seen as a probabilistic version of the potential
argument (under certain conditions, the potential decreases in expectation at
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every step by some fixed amount). To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study on the convergence time of these natural variants of best-response
dynamics. Prior studies (see next section) either focus on sufficient conditions to
guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria, or they consider noisy best-response
dynamics whose equilibria can be different from best-response.
We note that the general upper bound necessarily depends on the maximum
value of the potential, as these games include max-cut games which are PLS-
complete [29]: for such games, no centralized algorithm for computing a Nash
equilibrium in time polynomial in the number of players is known, and these
games are hard precisely when the potential can assume arbitrarily large values.
Obviously, one cannot hope that simple distributed dynamics do much better
than the best centralized procedure.
1.2 Related Work
Several works study convergence to Nash equilibria for simple variants of best-
response dynamics. A first line of research concerns the ability to converge to a
Nash equilibrium when the strict schedule of the moves of the players (one player
at a time) is relaxed [10]; they proved that any “separable” schedule guarantees
convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Other works study the convergence time
of specific dynamics with limited simultaneous moves: [19] introduce a “local”
coordination mechanism for congestion games (which are equivalent to potential
games [24]), while [15] shows that with limited simultaneous moves the dynamics
reaches quickly a state whose cost is not too far from the worst Nash equilibrium
[15]; Note that the reached state need not be a Nash equilibrium, and the required
condition is that every T consecutive best responses, each player has moved at
least once and at most β times. Fast convergence can be achieved in certain
linear congestion games if approximate equilibria are considered [9], that is,
players keep changing their strategies as long as a significant improvement is
possible.
Another well-studied variant of best-response dynamics is that of noisy or
logit (response) dynamics [6,7,1], where players’ responses is probabilistic and
determined by a noise parameter (as the noise tends to zero, players select al-
most surely best-responses, while for high noise they respond at random). These
dynamics turn out to behave differently from “deterministic” best-response in
many aspects. In the original logit dynamics by [6,7], where one randomly chosen
player moves at a time, they essentially rest on a subset of potential minimizers.
When the players’ schedule is relaxed, this property is lost and additional condi-
tions on the game are required [1,10,2,18,26]. Our independent better-response
dynamics can be seen as an analog of the independent dynamics of [1] for logit
response.
Potential games on graphs (a proper subclass of potential games) are well-
studied because of their many applications. In physics, ferro-magnetic systems
are modeled as noisy best-response dynamics on lattice graphs in which every
player (node) plays a coordination game with each neighbor (see, for example,
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[23] and Chapter 15 of [22]). The version in which the coordination game is asym-
metric (i.e., coordinating on one strategy is more profitable than another) is used
to model the diffusion of new technologies [25,21] and opinions [17] in social net-
works. Finally, potential games on graphs (every node plays some potential game
with each neighbor) characterize the class of potential games for which the equi-
libria of noisy best-response dynamics with all players updating simultaneously
can be “easily” computed [3]. The convergence time of best-response dynamics
for games on graphs is studied in [12,17]: Among other results, [12] showed that
a polynomial number of steps are sufficient when the same game is played on all
edges and the number of strategies is constant. Analogous results are proven for
finite opinion games in [17]. Finally, [4] characterize the class of potential games
which are also graphical games [20], where the potential can be decomposed into
the sum of potentials of “maximal” cliques of an underlying graph. Graphical
games have been studied in several works (see, e.g., [11,8,27,5]). The class of
local interaction potential games [3] is the restriction in which the potential can
be decomposed into pairwise (edge) potential games. In this work we deal pre-
cisely with this class of games. Since this class includes the so-called max-cut
games, which are known to be PLS-complete [29], it is considered unlikely that
an equilibrium can be computed efficiently, even by a centralized procedure.
Our dynamics are similar to the α-synchronous dynamics in cellular au-
tomata [16]. This latter model encompasses ours as long as the response strat-
egy can be implemented through an automata. This is the case for example with
symmetric coordination where best-response corresponds to majority rule (where
each cellular automaton tries to switch to the majority state of its neighbors).
However, most of the literature around cellular automata considers a regular
lattice topology and do not cover the case of general graphs we consider here. A
notable exception is the study of minority rule on general graphs [28] with similar
dynamics as ours. The present work can be seen as a first study of α-synchronous
dynamics on general graphs for the rules that follow from best-response to some
potential games with neighbors. Our results apply in particular to majority and
minority rules (where no action is taken in case of equality, i.e, when the two
most frequent states are equally represented among neighbors).
2 Model (Local Interaction Potential Games)
Intuitively speaking we consider a network (graph) where each node is a player
who repeatedly plays with her neighbors. We assume that a two-player potential
game (defined below) is associated to each edge of the graph. Each player must
play the same strategy on all the games associated to its incident edges, and her
payoff is the sum of the payoffs obtained in each of these games. We also assume
finite strategies, i.e. each player chooses her strategy within a finite set.
Symmetric Coordination Game. One of the simplest (potential) games is the
symmetric coordination game where each player chooses color B orW (for black
or white) and her payoff is 1 if players agree on their strategies, and 0 otherwise
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B W
B 1, 1 0, 0
W 0, 0 1, 1
(a) Symmetric
Coordination Game.
B W
B 2, 1 0, 0
W 0, 0 1, 2
(b) Another
Coordination Game.
B W
B −2 −1
W 0 −2
(c) Potential
for Game (b).
B W
B 2, 2 1, 1
W 0, 0 2, 2
(d) Game equivalent
to Game (b).
Fig. 1: Examples of (two-players) potential games. The game (b) has potential
function (c). Game (d) has same potential function (c) (signs changed for payoff),
it is equivalent to Game (b) (both games have same dynamics).
(see Figure 1a where the two numbers are the payoff for the row and the column
player, respectively).
General Potential Games. In a general game, we have n players, and each of
them can choose one color (strategy) and the combination c = (c1, . . . , cn) of all
colors gives to each player u some payoff PAYu(c). In a potential game, when
the change in the payoff of any player improves by some amount, some global
function P called the potential will be decreased by the same amount: For any
player u and any two configurations c and c′ which differ only in u’s strategy, it
holds that
PAYu(c
′)− PAYu(c) = P (c)− P (c′) . (1)
A configuration c is a (pure Nash) equilibrium if no player u can improve her
payoff, that is, the quantity above is negative or zero for all c′ = (c1, . . . , c
′
u, . . . , cn).
Conversely, c is not an equilibrium if there is a player u who can improve her
payoff (PAYu(c
′)−PAYu(c) > 0) in which case c′u is called a better response (to
strategies c). A best response is a better response maximizing this improvement,
over the possible strategies of the player. Potential games possess the following
nice feature: A configuration c is an equilibrium if and only if no player can
improve the potential function by changing her current strategy. In a general
(two-player) potential game the payoff of the players is not the same, and the
potential function is therefore not symmetric (see the example in Figure 1c).
Local interaction potential games [3]. In a local interaction potential game the
potential function can be decomposed into the sum of two-player potential
games, one for each edge of the network G:
P (c) =
∑
uv∈E(G)
Puv(cu, cv) . (2)
No edge exists if the strategies of the two players do not affect each others’ payoff
(the corresponding potential is constant and can be ignored). This definition
captures the following natural class of games on networks: Each edge corresponds
to some potential game, and the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs of
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the games with the neighbors. Note that a player chooses one strategy to be
played on all these games.
(Independent) Better-Response Dynamics. A simple procedure for computing
an equilibrium consists of repeatedly selecting one player who is currently not
playing a best response and let her play a better or best response. Every step
reduces the potential by a finite amount, and therefore this procedure terminates
into an equilibrium in O(M) time steps, where M is the maximum value for the
potential (w.l.o.g., we assume that the potential is always non-negative and takes
integer values4). Here we consider the variant in which, at each time step, each
player becomes independently active according to some probability, and those
who can improve their payoff change strategy accordingly:
Definition 1. In independent better-response dynamics, at each time step t
players do the following:
– Each player (node) u becomes active with some probability ptu which can
change over time (the case in which it is constant over time is a special case
of this one).
– Every active player (node) revises her strategy according to a better (or
best) response rule. If the current strategy is already a best response, then
no change is made.
Note that all players that are active at a certain time step may change their
strategies simultaneously. So, for example, it may happen that on the symmetric
coordination game in Figure 1a the two players move from state BW to state
WB and back if they are both active all the time.
Generic upper bound To show that dynamics converge quickly, we show that
the potential decreases in expectation at every step. To this end, we consider
the probability space of all possible evolutions of the dynamics. A configuration
c at a given time t is given by the colors chosen by players at the previous time
step (strategy profile) and by the values ptu used by users for randomly deciding
to be active at time t. The universe Ω is then defined as the set of all infinite
sequences c0, c1, . . . of configurations.
Definition 2 (δ-improving dynamics). Dynamics are δ-improving for a given
(local interaction) potential game if in expectation the potential decreases by at
least δ during each time step, unless the current configuration is an equilibrium.
That is, for any configuration c which is not an equilibrium, and any event
F tc = {c0, c1, . . . ∈ Ω | ct = c} where configuration c is reached at time t, we have
E[P t+1 − P t | F tc ] ≤ −δ
4 As we assume that strategy sets are finite, the potential function is defined by a finite
set of values. Rescaling the potential function so that different values are at least
1 apart, and then truncating the values to integers allows to obtain an equivalent
game (with same dynamics). Additionally shifting the values allows to obtain a
non-negative potential function for that game.
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where P t denotes the potential at time t.
The proof of the following theorem is based on standard Martingale argu-
ments and it is given in Appendix A.1 for completeness.
Theorem 1. The expected convergence time of any δ-improving dynamics is
O
(
M0
δ
)
where M0 is the expected potential of the game at time 0.
3 Networks With Symmetric Coordination Games
We first consider the scenario in which every edge of the network is the symmetric
coordination game in Figure 1a. The nodes of a graph G (players) can choose
between two colors B and W and are rewarded according to the number of
neighbors with same color. We are thus considering the dynamics in which nodes
attempt to choose the majority color of their neighbors and every active node
changes its color if more than half of its neighbors has the different color.
In order to analyze the convergence time of these dynamics, we shall relate
the probabilities of being active to the number of neighbors having a different
color. We say that u is unstable at time t if more than half of the neighbors has
the other color, that is,
dctu >
1
2
δu
where δu is the degree of u and dc
t
u is the number of neighbors of u that have a
color different from the color of u at time t. By definition, the dynamics converge
if no node is unstable. Note that we have dctu ≤ δu ≤ ∆u ≤ ∆ where ∆ =
maxu∈V (G) δu is the maximum degree of the graph, and ∆u = maxuv∈E(G) δv is
the local maximum degree in the neighborhood of u.
For the case of symmetric coordination games, the potential function of a
configuration is the number of edges whose endpoints have different colors: An
edge uv is said to be conflicting in configuration c if u and v have different colors.
Therefore the potential is at most the number m of edges.
Theorem 2. Fix some real values p, q ∈ (0, 1). If we have ptu ∈ [ p∆ , q∆u ] for
all u, t in a symmetric coordination game, then the expected convergence time is
O
(
∆m0
p(1−q)
)
where m0 is the initial number of conflicting edges, ∆ is the maxi-
mum degree, and ∆u is the maximum degree in the neighborhood of u.
As an immediate corollary, we have the following result for the case in which
all nodes are active with the same probability probability p.
Corollary 1. If all unstable nodes are active with probability p < 1−ε∆ for ε > 0,
then the dynamics converge to a stable state in O(m0pε ) expected time.
Theorem 2 derives from the following lemma and Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Any dynamics satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 2 are δ-improving
for δ = p(1− q)/∆.
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Proof. Consider the event F tc where a configuration c is reached at time t. Let C
t
denote the number of conflicting edges in c, and U t be the set of unstable nodes
at time t respectively. Recall that the number of conflicting edges is equal to the
potential, that is, P t = Ct. We now express E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] as a function of
the values {ptu | u ∈ V (G)} associated to c.
For that purpose, we first analyze the probability that any given edge of c is
conflicting after the random choices made at time t. We distinguish the following
types of edges. Let S1 (resp. S2) denote the set of edges in c with the same color
and one unstable extremity (resp. two). Similarly, let C1 (resp. C2) denote the
set of edges in c with conflicting colors and one unstable extremity (resp. two).
Note that Ct = |C1| + |C2|. A conflicting edge uv will become non-conflicting
if only one extremity changes its color. Similarly, a non-conflicting edge uv will
become conflicting if only one extremity changes its color. Due to independence of
choices, this happens in both cases with probability ptuv = p
t
u(1−ptv)+(1−ptu)ptv
if both u and v are unstable, and with probability ptu if u is unstable and v is
not. By linearity of expectation, we then obtain:
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] =
∑
uv∈S1
ptu +
∑
uv∈S2
ptuv −
∑
uv∈C1
ptu −
∑
uv∈C2
ptuv . (3)
(When we note uv ∈ C1 (resp. uv ∈ S1), we assume that u is unstable and v is
not.) By definition, each unstable node u sees more conflicting edges than non-
conflicting ones, thus implying By multiplying by ptu and then summing over all
unstable nodes, we obtain:
∑
u∈Ut
ptu +
∑
uv∈S1
ptu +
∑
uv∈S2
(ptu + p
t
v) ≤
∑
uv∈C1
ptu +
∑
uv∈C2
(ptu + p
t
v) . (4)
As ptuv = p
t
u + p
t
v − 2ptuptv, we deduce from (3) and (4):
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤
∑
uv∈C2
2ptup
t
v −
∑
u∈Ut
ptu . (5)
Since every edge uv ∈ C2 has both endpoints in U t, we can rewrite (5) as
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤
∑
u∈Ut
ptu
(
− 1 +
∑
v|uv∈C2
ptv
)
.
Using ptv ≤ q∆v ≤
q
δu
and ptu ≥ p∆ , we obtain the following inequality: E[Ct+1 −
Ct | F tc ] ≤
∑
u∈Ut
p
∆ (−1 + q) = −p(1− q) |U
t|
∆ . This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Adaptive probabilities The upper bound of Theorem 2 can be improved if
nodes are aware of the number of neighbors that are willing to change strategy
(unstable) and then set accordingly the probability of changing too. More pre-
cisely, one can think of active nodes announcing to their neighbors that they
are unstable and that they would like to switch to the other color, before actu-
ally doing so. Then, each unstable node will switch with a probability inversely
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proportional to the number of unstable neighbors. The following theorem shows
that this yields an improved upper bound on the convergence time.
Theorem 3. Fix some real values p, q ∈ (0, 12
)
. If we have ptu ∈ [ pdt
u
+1 ,
q
dt
u
+1 ] for
all u, t in a symmetric coordination game, where dtu is the number of conflicting
unstable neighbors of u, then the expected convergence time is O
(
m0
p(1−2q)
)
where
m0 is the initial number of conflicting edges.
To prove this theorem we adapt the proof of Lemma 1 and show that these
dynamics are δ-improving for δ = p(1− 2q) (see Appendix A.4 for details).
Fully local dynamics Theorem 2 requires that each node is aware of a bound
on the maximum degree, or the local maximum degree in her neighborhood for
setting ptu. Theorem 3 requires knowledge of the number of conflicting unstable
neighbors at each time step. We next consider dynamics that are fully local as
each node u can set the probabilities ptu by only looking at its own degree.
Theorem 4. Fix some real values p, q ∈ (0, 12
)
. If we have ptu ∈ [ pδu ,
q
δu
] for
all u, t in a symmetric coordination game, where δu is the degree of u, then
the expected convergence time is O
(
∆m0
p(1−2q)
)
where m0 is the initial number of
conflicting edges.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorems 2 and 3 (see Ap-
pendix A.5).
Tightness of the results We can use the example in Figure 2 to show that
the analysis of Theorems 2, 3, and 4 is tight, and adaptive dynamics are prov-
ably faster than non-adaptive ones. Intuitively, the construction is such that the
following holds:
– Initially only the extreme nodes of the leftmost path are unstable. After an
unstable node become black, the next neighbor in the path (and only that
one) becomes unstable.
– The process proceeds from left to right, and nodes in certain path become
unstable only after all nodes in the previous path became black (except for
the last path with r/2 nodes).
– Inside the path containing the only unstable nodes, the process is sequential:
the path becomes black from extremities to center. At most two nodes are
unstable: the extremities of the sub-path of white nodes. meaning that after
one node changes color, its neighbor (and only that) becomes unstable.
These observations imply that any dynamics in which nodes become active with
probability p ≃ α, require Ω(r2/α) = Ω(n/α) steps.
Since every node has degree Θ(r) = Θ(
√
n) = Θ(∆), and the initial con-
figuration has m0 = Θ(r
2) = Θ(n) conflicting edges (those between the clique
and the first path), non-adaptive dynamics take Θ(∆m0) = Θ(n
3/2) time steps.
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r + 1
r r − 1 r/2
· · ·
r − 2
r + 1
Clique Paths
r r − 2
r − 1
Fig. 2: Example of network with faster adaptive dynamics than non-adaptive
ones. The network is composed of r/2 + 2 parts for even r: a clique and r/2 + 1
paths. Below each part, we indicate the number of nodes in the part. Each node
in a path is connected to all nodes to the right and to the left path (or clique
for the first path) as feature by demi-edges with degree indications w.r.t. the
previous and the next part of the construction.
On the contrary, adaptive dynamics take Θ(m0) = Θ(n) steps since the number
dtu of unstable conflicting neighbors of each node u is at most 1. Therefore, the
analysis of Theorems 2, 3, and 4 is tight. Moreover, the adaptive dynamics are
provably faster than non-adaptive ones.
4 An Exponential Lower Bound when the Degree is
Unbounded
In this section we prove a lower bound for the case of symmetric coordination
game on each edge and dynamics with constant probabilities, that is, the case in
which every node becomes active with some probability p which does not depend
on the graph nor on the time, and which is the same over all nodes.
Theorem 5. For every p > 0, there are starting configurations of the complete
bipartite graph where the expected number of steps to converge to an equilibrium
is exponential in the number of nodes.
Proof Idea. Consider the continuous version of the problem in which, instead
of a bipartite graph with n nodes on each side, we imagine L and R being two
continuous intervals (see figure below). Start from a symmetric configuration in
which a fraction α > 1/2 of the players in L has color W and the same fraction
in R has the other color B. Suppose that
α =
1
2− p .
Then after one step the system reaches the symmetric configuration, that is, a
fraction α of nodes in L has color B and the same fraction in R has color W .
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Indeed, the fraction β of players with color B in L after one step is precisely
β = 1− α+ p · α = 1− p
2− p +
p
2− p = α .
α
p α
L
α + p α  = α
a
c
t
iv
e
R L R
α
α α
a
c
t
iv
e
1−
Fig. 3: The idea of the proof of Theorem 5 (active nodes change color leading
to a symmetric configuration for suitable α). All the nodes on the left (L) are
adjacent to all nodes on the right (R).
We next prove the theorem via Chernoff bounds. For ǫ = p/3 consider the
interval around(α) := [(1 − ǫ)α, (1 + ǫ)α], and let CY CLE(t) be the following
event:
CY CLE(t) := {At time t a fraction αL ∈ around(α) of the nodes in L
has some color c, and a fraction αR ∈ around(α) of the nodes in R has
the other color c (where B =W and W = B).}
We say that the configuration is balanced at time t when CY CLE(t) holds.
Since ǫ < p/2 we have (1 − ǫ)α > 1/2, and thus the best response of every
(active) node in a balanced configuration is to switch color (since both αLn and
αRn are strictly larger than n/2). Chernoff bounds guarantee that with high
probability enough many nodes will be activated and therefore will switch to
obtain a symmetric balanced configuration. Formally, the following lemma holds
(see Appendix A.2 for the proof).
Lemma 2. For any t, it holds that P [CY CLE(t + 1)| CY CLE(t)] ≥ 1 −
4 exp
(
− δ23 µ
)
, where δ = ǫ1+ǫ and µ = p(1 + ǫ)αn with ǫ = p/3.
Proof (of Theorem 5). Consider any starting configuration which is balanced,
that is, CY CLE(0) holds. By Lemma 2, the probability that the event CY CLE(1)∧
· · · ∧ CY CLE(t) holds is at least (1 − q)t where q = 4 exp
(
− δ23 µ
)
. Since
CY CLE(t) implies that at least one node is unstable, the probability that we
reach an equilibrium in t steps is thus at least (1− q)t−1. The expected time for
convergence is thus at least
∑
t≥0 t(1− q)t−1 = 1/q2. ⊓⊔
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Simple calculations lead to the following result (see Appendix A.3 for details).
Corollary 2. Starting from any balanced configuration, the expected number of
steps to converge to an equilibrium in the complete bipartite graph is eΩ(n
1−3c),
as long as p ≥ 1/nc with 0 ≤ c < 1/3.
5 General Local Interaction Potential Games
In this section we extend the upper bound of Theorem 2 to general local in-
teraction potential games: each edge uv of G is associated with a (two-player)
potential game with potential Puv. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the potential Puv takes integer non-negative values. The upper bound is given
in terms of the following quantity:
∆P := max
u
∑
v∈N(u)
∆Puv , (6)
where ∆Puv denotes the maximum value of Puv. Note that for symmetric coor-
dination games, ∆P is simply the maximum degree ∆ of the graph.
Theorem 6. For any p, q ∈ (0, 1/2), if we have ptu ∈ [ p∆P ,
q
∆P
] for all u and t
and for ∆P defined as in (6) in a general local interaction potential game, then
the expected convergence time is O
(
n∆2
P
p(1−2q)
)
.
We shall prove later that n∆P is an upper bound on the global potential.
Therefore to prove the theorem it suffice to show that in expectation the global
potential improves as follows:
Lemma 3. Any dynamics satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 6 is δ-improving
for δ = p(1− q)/∆P .
Proof. Consider the event F tc where a configuration c is reached at time t. Let
P t := P (ct) =
∑
uv∈E(G) Puv(c
t
u, c
t
v) denote the global potential of the game
in configuration c. A node is unstable when it can improve its total payoff by
changing ctu to some c
′
u, which corresponds to an equal improvement on the
global potential of the game according to (1). We then let
µuuv = −(Puv(c′u, ctv)− Puv(ctu, ctv))
denote the improvement obtained on the game with a neighbor v, and the sum∑
v∈N(u) µ
u
uv ≥ 1 being the total improvement. Node u then changes for strategy
c′u with probability p
t
u.
Let C1 denote the edges uv such that u is unstable at time t and v is not. Let
C2 denote the edges uv such that both u and v are unstable. The set of unstable
nodes at time t is denoted by U t. By linearity of expectation, we have
E[P t+1−P t | F tc ] = −
∑
uv∈C1
ptuµ
u
uv−
∑
uv∈C2
(ptu(1−ptv)µuuv+ptv(1−ptu)µvuv−ptuptvνuvuv )
(7)
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where νuvuv = Puv(c
′
u, c
′
v) − Puv(ctu, ctv) denotes the variation in the potential of
edge uv when both u and v change their colors.
As each unstable node expects a gain of at least 1 (since the potential takes
integer values), we have
∑
uv∈C1
ptuµ
u
uv +
∑
uv∈C2
(ptuµ
u
uv + p
t
vµ
v
uv) ≥
∑
u∈Ut
ptu . (8)
By combining (7) and (8) we obtain
E[P t+1 − P t | F tc ] ≤ −
∑
u∈Ut
ptu +
∑
uv∈C2
ptup
t
v(µ
u
uv + µ
v
uv + ν
uv
uv ) .
The last factor in the second sum simplifies to
µuuv+µ
v
uv+ ν
uv
uv = Puv(c
t
u, c
t
v)+Puv(c
′
u, c
′
v)−Puv(c′u, ctv)−Puv(ctu, c′v) ≤ 2∆Puv .
We thus obtain
E[P t+1−P t | F tc ] ≤ −
∑
u∈Ut
ptu+
∑
uv∈C2
2ptup
t
v∆Puv =
∑
u∈Ut
ptu(−1+
∑
v|uv∈C2
ptv∆Puv ) .
Since
∑
v|uv∈C2
∆Puv ≤ ∆P , ptu ≥ p∆P , and ptv ≤
q
∆P
, we obtain E[P t+1 − P t |
F tc ] ≤ −p(1− q) |U
t|
∆P
. This completes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6 then follows from Theorem 1 as we observe that the global po-
tential is bounded from above by
∑
uv∈E(G)∆Puv =
∑
u
∑
v|uv∈E(G)∆Puv/2 ≤
n∆P /2.
5.1 Two Examples of Local Interaction Potential Games
In this section we discuss two examples of local interaction potential games and
how the result of Theorem 6 relates to them.
Finite Opinion Games [17] Consider a game where each player must decide
between two opinions, 0 or 1, and each player has some internal belief bu ∈ (0, 1).
Since there are only two strategies, cu ∈ {0, 1}, better-response and best-response
coincide. According to [17], the payoff of player u depends on the opinion of her
neighbors and on her own belief,
PAYu(c) = −

(cu − bu)2 +
∑
v∈N(u)
(cu − cv)2

 .
and game is a potential game, with the potential function being
P (c) = C(c) +
∑
u
(cu − bu)2,
where C(c) is the number of conflicting edges, that is, the edges whose end-
points have different opinions. We can easily see that these are local interaction
potential games by viewing the game as follows:
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– Between u and every neighbor v ∈ N(u), we play the symmetric coordination
game (payoff is 1 if they have the same opinion, and 0 otherwise).
– Each player u is connected to her own opinion node, that is, a dummy node
u∗ who has only strategy bu available. Between u and u
∗ we play a “trivial”
coordination game in which u has payoff Puu∗(cu) = −(cu − bu)2.
Finally, in better- or best-response dynamics, one can restrict to bu ∈ {1/4, 3/4}
[17], which makes it possible to have integral potential (simply multiply all pay-
offs by 16). Overall, we can bound the quantity ∆P in (6) as
16∆ ≤ ∆P ≤ 16(∆+ 1)
where ∆ is the maximum degree in the network (without the dummy nodes u∗).
Theorem 6 then yields the following:
Corollary 3. In finite opinion games on networks of maximum degree ∆, the
expected converge time of independent better-response dynamics is O(n∆2) when-
ever ptu =
α
∆ for some α ∈ [ p16 , q16 ] with p, q ∈ (0, 1/2).
The next example says that one cannot hope to get polynomial convergence
time independent of ‘∆P ’ in general.
Max-Cut Games [29] Consider a complete weighted graph in which every
edge e = (u, v) corresponds to a symmetric coordination game rescaled by the
weight we of this edge,
B W
B we, we 0, 0
W 0, 0 we, we
The two possible strategies of each player (B or W ) determine a partition of
the players into two groups, and the potential is simply the value of the cut
of the resulting partition (sum of edge weights between the two groups). These
problems are PLS-complete [29] meaning that one does not expect to have an
algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium in time polynomial in the number
of players, regardless of the weights.
Max-cut games are hard when the weights are arbitrary, that is, when the ∆P
term is not polynomially-bounded. In such instances, even centralized algorithms
are not expected to find a Nash equilibrium in time polynomial in the number
of players.
6 Conclusion
This work provides bounds on the time to converge to a (pure Nash) equilibrium
when players are active independently with some probability and they better or
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best respond to each others current strategies. Our study focuses on a natural
(sub)class of potential games, namely, local interaction potential games. The
bounds suggest that the time to converge to an equilibrium must depend on the
degree of the nodes in the underlying network:
– These (distributed) dynamics can converge quickly if players are lazy, that is,
if the probability of being active is inversely proportional to the maximum
degree (the precise bounds are given by Theorems 2 and 6).
– Conversely, non-lazy dynamics can take exponential time even in simple
cases, where non-lazy means that the probability of being active is too high
with respect to the network degree (e.g., when this probability is 1/∆α for
some α < 1/3 and ∆ being the maximum degree – see Corollary 2).
This suggests a sort of threshold effect due to the maximum degree of the net-
work. This parameter has a natural interpretation as it corresponds to the num-
ber of players (nodes) that can affect the payoff of a single player (node).
Since our bounds hold for local interaction potential games, it would be
interesting to investigate whether analogous results hold for general potential
games (note that one can always construct a graph representing the dependencies
between players, by connecting two players whenever payoff of one depends also
on the strategy of the other). Here a relevant notion is that of graphical games
[20] and the results in [4]. It would also be interesting to sharpen some of our
bounds to show that p ≃ 1/∆ is essentially the threshold between fast and slow
convergence: Is it the case that, for every α < 1, if all nodes are active with
some probability p ≃ 1/∆α, then the dynamics does not converge in polynomial
time in some graphs of maximum degree ∆? Finally, it would be interesting to
investigate the range p ∈ [1/n, 1/n1/3] (according to Theorem 2 and Corollary 2,
this is where convergence time seems to change from polynomial to exponential).
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A Postponed proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We make use of the following lemma which derives from classical martingale theory
(we include a proof for the sake of completeness).
Lemma 4. Let (Xt)t∈N a sequence of discrete random variables with values in {0, . . . ,M},
and let T = min
{
t : Xt = 0
}
be the stopping time defined as the random variable for
the first time t where Xt = 0. Suppose that for some ǫ > 0
E[Xt+1 −Xt | X0 = x0 ∧ . . . ∧Xt = xt] ≤ −ε
for all tuples of values x0, . . . , xt ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Then we have E[T ] ≤ E[X
0]
ε
.
Proof. We first show E[T ] < ∞. As the variables Xt are bounded we can obtain a
lower bound on the probability that Xt decreases by ε/2 at time t: for any tuple of
positive values (x0, . . . , xt), we consider the event F =
{
X0 = x0 ∧ . . . ∧Xt = xt
}
and
prove
P
[
Xt+1 −Xt < −ε/2 | F
]
≥
ε
2M
. (9)
From the definition of conditional expectation, we have
E[Xt+1 −Xt | F ] =
∫
F
(Xt+1 −Xt)dP
P [F ]
.
The assumption on the expected variation of Xt at time t then implies
−εP [F ] ≥
∫
{Xt+1−Xt<−ε/2}∩F
(Xt+1−Xt)dP +
∫
{Xt+1−Xt≥−ε/2}∩F
(Xt+1−Xt)dP .
Using Xt+1 −Xt ≥ −M , we get
−εP [F ] ≥ −MP [
{
Xt+1 −Xt < −ε/2
}
∩ F ]−
ε
2
P [
{
Xt+1 −Xt ≥ −ε/2
}
∩ F ] .
Equation 9 is then deduced from P [F ] ≥ P [
{
Xt+1 −Xt ≥ −ε/2
}
∩ F ].
Now, for integral τ > 1, we have Xt+τ ≤ Xt − ετ/2 when Xs+1 −Xs < −ε/2 for
s ∈ {t, . . . , t+ τ − 1}. We thus have:
P [Xt+τ ≤ Xt − ετ/2 | T ≥ t+ τ − 1] ≥ (ε/2M)τ .
Fix τ > 2M/ε. As Xt ≤M , we have Xt − ετ/2 < 0 and obtain:
P [T ≥ t+ τ | T ≥ t] = 1− P [Xt+τ = 0 ∧ T ≥ t+ τ − 1 | T ≥ t] < 1− (ε/2M)τ .
For integral k, we thus have P [T ≥ kτ ] < αk where α = 1 − (ε/2M)τ . Using P [T =
t] ≤ P [T ≥ kτ ] for kτ ≥ t, we can then write E[T ] ≤
∑
k≥1 kτα
k ≤ ατ/(1− α)2 <∞.
We finally apply Doob’s optional stopping theorem to the random variables Y t
defined as follows. Given the outcomes x0, . . . , xt−1 of X0, . . . , Xt−1, we set Y t =
0 if xs = 0 for some s < t and Y t = Xt + εt otherwise. First note that Y t is a
supermartingale: Consider values y0, . . . , yt. If ys = 0 for some s ≤ t, we have ys
′
= 0
for s′ ≥ s and E[Y t+1 | Y 0 = y0 ∧ . . . ∧ Y t = yt] = 0 = yt. Otherwise, y0, . . . , yt are
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all positive and E[Y t+1 | Y 0 = y0 ∧ . . . ∧ Y t = yt] = yt + E[Xt+1 − yt + ε | X0 =
y0 ∧ . . . ∧ Xt = yt] ≤ yt according to the assumption on the expected variation of
Xt at time t. Second, we have E[T ] < ∞ and |Y t+1 − Y t| ≤ M + ε. Doob’s theorem
thus applies: Y T is well defined and E[Y T ] ≤ E[Y 0]. That is E[XT + εT ] ≤ E[X0]. As
XT = 0, linearity of expectation yields E[T ] ≤ E[X0]/ε. ⊓⊔
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). Set Xt = P t if there are unstable nodes and Xt = 0 otherwise
where P t denotes the value of the potential of the game at time t. For a given sequence of
positive integers x0, . . . , xt, consider the event F ⊂ Ω where all configuration sequences
in F satisfy X0 = x0, . . . , Xt = xt. For a given configuration c that can occur at time t
in F , recall that F tc denote the set of sequences c
0, c1, . . . in F where ct = c. Note that
E[Xt+1 −Xt | X0 = x0 ∧ . . . ∧Xt = xt] = E[P t+1 − P t|F ] .
Since F = ∪cF
t
c is a disjoint union we have
E[P t+1 − P t|F ] =
∑
c E[P
t+1 − P t|F tc ]P [F
t
c ]
P [F ]
since no considered c is an equilibrium and the dynamics is ε-improving
E[P t+1 − P t|F ] ≤
∑
c−εP [F
t
c ]
P [F ]
= −ε .
By Lemma 4 we get E[T ] ≤ M0
ε
where T is the expected convergence time of the
dynamics (by definition of random variables Xt) and M0 = E[P
0] is the expected
potential at time 0. ⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By definition of CY CLE(t), at at time t a fraction α′ = αL of nodes in L has
color c and a fraction αR > 1/2 of nodes in R has color c. The best response for nodes
in L is thus c. Therefore at time t+ 1 the fraction α′′ of nodes in L having color c is
α′′ = 1− α′ + Y/n
where Y is the number of nodes among the α′n of color c that are activated. The
expectation of Y is µ = pα′n and Chernoff bounds imply
P [Y/n ≥ (1− δ)pα′] ≥ 1− exp
(
−
δ2
2
µ
)
,
P [Y/n ≤ (1 + δ)pα′] ≥ 1− exp
(
−
δ2
3
µ
)
.
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We next show two implications saying that the dynamics keeps oscillating ‘around’ the
value α as long as Y is close to its expectation according to δ = ǫ
1+ǫ
:
Y/n ≥ (1− δ)pα′ and α′ ≤(1 + ǫ)α ⇒ α′′ ≥1− α′ + pα′ − δpα′
=1− α′(1− p)− δpα′
≥1− (1 + ǫ)α(1− p)− δp(1 + ǫ)α
=1− α(1− p)− ǫα(1− p)− δp(1 + ǫ)α
(since 1− α(1− p) = α) =α(1− ǫ) + ǫαp− δp(1 + ǫ)α
(since δ =
ǫ
1 + ǫ
) ≥α(1− ǫ) .
Similarly,
Y/n ≤ (1 + δ)pα′ and α′ ≥(1− ǫ)α ⇒ α′′ ≤1− α′ + pα′ + δpα′
=1− α′(1− p) + δpα′
(using α′ ≤ (1 + ǫ)α) ≤1− (1− ǫ)α(1− p) + δp(1 + ǫ)α
=1− α(1− p) + ǫα(1− p) + δp(1 + ǫ)α
(since 1− α(1− p) = α) =α(1 + ǫ)− ǫαp+ δp(1 + ǫ)α
(since δ =
ǫ
1 + ǫ
) ≤α(1 + ǫ) .
A symmetric argument applies to L and R exchanged. We have thus shown that given
CY CLE(t) event CY CLE(t + 1) holds unless Y > (1 + δ)µ or Y < (1 − δ)µ, or a
symmetric situation holds with L and R exchanged. Then the union bound implies
P [¬CY CLE(t+ 1)| CY CLE(t)] ≤ 4 exp
(
− δ
2
3
µ
)
, which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. In Lemma 2 we have
δ2µ =
(
p
3 + p
)2
p(1 +
p
3
)αn =
p3n
(3 + p)3(2− p)
>
p3n
24
≥
n1−3c
24
and the expected number of steps to converge to an equilibrium is
Ω(exp(δ2µ/3)) = Ω(exp(n1−3c/72)) = eΩ(n
1−3c).
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We adapt the proof of Lemma 1 and show that these dynamics are δ-improving
for δ = p(1 − 2q). Recall that C2 denotes the conflicting edges between two unstable
nodes at time t. We thus have dtu = |{v | uv ∈ C2}|. From Equation 5 in the proof of
Lemma 1, we have
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤
∑
uv∈C2
2ptup
t
v −
∑
u∈Ut
ptu .
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In the first sum, we can associate the weight 2ptup
t
v to node u if p
t
u ≥ p
t
v and node v
otherwise. We thus get
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤
∑
u∈Ut
ptu

−1 + ∑
v|uv∈C2,ptv≤p
t
u
2ptv

 ≤ ∑
u∈Ut
ptu
(
−1 + 2ptud
t
u
)
.
Using ptu ∈ [
p
dt
u
+1
, q
dt
u
+1
], we obtain
E[Ct+1 −Ct | F tc ] ≤ −p(1− 2q)
∑
u∈Ut
1
dtu + 1
.
As
∣∣U t∣∣ > maxu dtu, we finally have
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤ −p(1− 2q) .
The theorem follows from Theorem 1 and from the fact that the potential is the number
of conflicting edges. ⊓⊔
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we obtain
E[Ct+1 − Ct | F tc ] ≤ −p(1− 2q)
∑
u∈Ut
1
δu
≤ −p(1− 2q)
|U t|
∆
.
We then conclude similarly as in the proof of Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
